Immediate Outcome 1

Money laundering and terrorist financing risks are identified, assessed and understood, policies are co-operatively developed and, where appropriate, actions co-ordinated domestically to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

Core Issues to be considered in determining if the Outcome is being achieved

1. How well does the country identify, assess and understand its ML/TF risks?
2. How well do national AML/CFT policies and activities address the identified ML/TF risks?
3. To what extent are the results of the assessment(s) of ML/TF risks properly used to justify exemptions and support the application of enhanced measures for higher risk scenarios, or simplified measures for lower risk scenarios?
4. To what extent are the objectives and activities of the competent authorities and SRBs consistent with the evolving national AML/CFT policies and with the ML/TF risks identified?
5. To what extent do the competent authorities and SRBs co-operate and co-ordinate the development and implementation of policies to combat ML/TF?
6. To what extent do the competent authorities co-operate and, where appropriate, co-ordinate for operational purposes related to AML/CFT.

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Immediate Outcome 2

International co-operation delivers appropriate information, financial intelligence and evidence, and facilitates action against criminals and their property.

Core Issues to be considered in determining if the Outcome is being achieved

1. To what extent has the country provided constructive and timely mutual legal assistance and extradition to respond to requests, e.g. to provide evidence or locate and extradite criminals in relation to ML, associated predicate offences and TF; and to facilitate asset recovery, including enforcement of foreign freezing, seizing and confiscation orders? What is the quality of such assistance provided?
2. To what extent has the country sought mutual legal assistance and extradition in an appropriate and timely manner e.g. to request evidence or to locate and extradite criminals in relation to ML, associated predicate offences and TF; or to facilitate asset recovery, including foreign enforcement of freezing, seizing and confiscation orders?
3. To what extent do the different competent authorities use other forms of international co-operation to seek information or assistance from foreign authorities in an appropriate and timely manner for AML/CFT purposes, including asset recovery? This should include all relevant types of information (such as criminal records and intelligence, and other information on the identity of a suspect; financial information; financial intelligence; and basic and beneficial ownership information) and covers information and assistance from relevant competent authorities (such as supervisors; FIUs; law enforcement agencies; authorities with responsibility for asset recovery or asset management and customs and tax authorities).
4. To what extent do the different competent authorities use other forms of international co-operation to provide information or assistance to foreign authorities in a constructive and timely manner (including spontaneously) for AML/CFT purposes, including asset recovery? This should include all relevant types of information (such as criminal records and intelligence, and other information on the identify of a suspect; financial information; financial intelligence; and basic and beneficial ownership information), and covers other information and assistance from relevant competent authorities (such as supervisors; FIUs; law enforcement agencies; authorities with responsibility for asset recovery or asset management, and customs and tax authorities).

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Immediate Outcome 3

Supervisors appropriately supervise, monitor and regulate financial institutions and VASPs for compliance with AML/CFT requirements, and financial institutions and VASPs adequately apply AML/CFT preventive measures, and report suspicious transactions. The actions taken by supervisors, financial institutions and VASPs are commensurate with the risks.

Core Issues to be considered in determining if the Outcome is being achieved

1. How well does licensing, registration or other controls implemented by supervisors or other authorities prevent, criminals and their associates from holding, or being the beneficial owner of a significant or controlling interest or holding a management function in financial institutions and VASPs? How well are breaches of such licensing or registration requirements detected and addressed as appropriate?
2. How well do the supervisors identify, understand, and promote financial institutions and VASPs understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations? This includes identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of institutions, and of individual institutions and VASPs over time.
3. How well do financial institutions and VASPs understand the level and the nature of their ML/TF risks? This includes demonstrating understanding of the evolution of ML/TF risks over time.
4. How well do financial institutions and VASPs understand and apply AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures and appropriate to their business activities, including as regards:
   1. the CDD and record-keeping measures (including in relation to beneficial ownership information and ongoing monitoring)
   2. the enhanced or specific measures for:
      • PEPs,
      • correspondent banking,
      • new technologies,
      • wire and virtual asset transfer rules, and
      • high-risk countries identified by the FATF?
   3. their AML/CFT reporting obligations? What are the practical measures to prevent tipping off?
   4. internal controls and procedures and audit requirements (including at group level where applicable) to ensure compliance with AML/CFT requirements?
   5. to what extent are there legal or regulatory requirements (e.g. financial secrecy) impeding implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures?
5. With a view to mitigating the risks, how well do supervisors monitor and/or supervise the extent to which financial institutions and VASPs are complying with their AML/CFT requirements?
6. To what extent has monitoring and/or supervision, including outreach, training and applying remedial actions and/or effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, where appropriate, had a demonstrable positive impact on compliance by financial institutions and VASPs over time?

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Immediate Outcome 4

Supervisors appropriately supervise, monitor and regulate DNFBPs for compliance with AML/CFT requirements, and DNFBPs adequately apply AML/CFT preventive measures commensurate with the risks, and report suspicious transactions.

Core Issues to be considered in determining if the Outcome is being achieved

1. How well do licensing, registration or other controls implemented by supervisors or other authorities prevent criminals and their associates from holding, or being the beneficial owner of a significant or controlling interest or holding a management function in DNFBPs? How well are breaches of such licensing or registration requirements detected and addressed as appropriate?
2. How well do supervisors identify, understand and promote regulated entities understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT requirements? This includes identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in different sectors and types of DNFBPs, and of individual DNFBPs over time.
3. How well do DNFBPs understand the nature of the level of their ML/TF risks? This includes demonstrating understanding of the evolution of ML/TF risks over time.
4. How well do DNFBPs understand and apply AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures appropriate to their business activities, including as regards:
   • the CDD and record-keeping measures (including in relation to beneficial ownership information and ongoing monitoring)?
   • the enhanced or specific measures for: (i) PEPs, (ii) new technologies, (iii) high-risk countries identified by the FATF?
   • their AML/CFT reporting obligations? What are the practical measures to prevent tipping off?
   • internal controls and procedures and audit requirements (including at group level where applicable) to ensure compliance with AML/CFT requirements?
   • To what extent are there legal or regulatory requirements impeding implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures?
5. With a view to mitigating the risks, how well do supervisors, monitor and/or supervise the extent to which DNFBPs (including at group level where applicable), are complying with their AML/CFT requirements?
6. To what extent has monitoring and/or supervision, including, providing outreach, training and applying remedial actions and/or effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions where appropriate, had a demonstrable positive impact on compliance by DNFBPs over time?

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Immediate Outcome 5

Legal persons and arrangements are prevented from misuse for money laundering or terrorist financing, and information on their beneficial ownership is available to competent authorities without impediments.

Core Issues to be considered in determining if the Outcome is being achieved

1. How well does the country identify, assess and understand its ML/TF risks associated with legal persons created in the country and foreign-created legal persons that have sufficient links with the country? How well does the country identify, assess and understand its ML/TF risks associated with legal arrangements governed under their law, administered in their country or for which the trustee or equivalent resides in their country, and types of foreign legal arrangements that have sufficient links with their country?
2. How well has the country implemented measures to prevent, manage and mitigate the risks associated with the misuse of legal persons and arrangements for ML/TF purposes, including measures to address the risk of misuse of bearer shares, bearer share warrants, nominee directors and nominee shareholders?
3. To what extent can relevant competent authorities obtain adequate, accurate and up-to-date basic and beneficial ownership information on all types of legal persons created in the country and foreign-created legal persons that present ML/TF risks and have sufficient links with their country, in a timely manner?
4. To what extent can relevant competent authorities obtain in a timely manner adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on: (a) the basic and beneficial ownership of the legal arrangement; (b) the residence of the trustees and their equivalents; and (c) any assets held or managed by the financial institution or DNFBP, in relation to any trustees or their equivalents with which they have a business relationship, or for which they undertake an occasional transaction? To what extent can relevant competent authorities obtain basic information on other regulated agents of, and service providers to, such trusts and similar legal arrangements, including but not limited to investment advisors or managers, accountants and tax advisors?
5. To what extent are effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions applied against persons who do not comply with the information requirements?

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Immediate Outcome 6

Financial intelligence and all other relevant information are appropriately used by competent authorities for money laundering and terrorist financing investigations.

Core Issues to be considered in determining if the Outcome is being achieved

1. To what extent does the FIU access a broad range of reports, data and other information (STRs received185 cash transaction reports, cross-border declarations or disclosures on currency and bearer negotiable instruments and other sources of information) to perform its functions? To what extent do other competent authorities access a broad range of reports, data and other information (including information from STRs, where allowed by national legislation) to perform their functions? Do these reports and information sources contain relevant, accurate and up to date data, and does the FIU and other relevant competent authorities have timely access to them?
2. To what extent is the FIU producing and disseminating financial intelligence to support the operational needs of competent authorities? Where relevant, to what extent are other competent authorities also producing financial intelligence using accessible FIU data and other relevant information that support their needs?
3. To what extent do the FIU and other competent authorities co-operate and exchange financial intelligence and information? How securely do the FIU and other competent authorities protect the confidentiality of the information they exchange or use (including financial intelligence disseminated to competent authorities by the FIU)?
4. To what extent do competent authorities use financial intelligence and other relevant information in investigations to develop evidence, identify assets and trace criminal proceeds or instrumentalities related to ML, associated predicate offences and TF?

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Immediate Outcome 7

Money laundering offences and activities are investigated and offenders are prosecuted and subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.

Core Issues to be considered in determining if the Outcome is being achieved

1. How well, and in what circumstances is ML activity identified and investigated (including through parallel financial investigations)?
2. To what extent is ML activity (including different types of ML cases) being prosecuted190 and offenders convicted?
3. To what extent are the sanctions applied against natural or legal persons convicted of ML offences effective, proportionate and dissuasive?
4. To what extent do countries apply other criminal justice measures in cases where a ML investigation has been pursued but where it is not possible, for justifiable reasons, to secure a ML conviction? Such alternative measures should not diminish the importance of, or be a substitute for, prosecutions and convictions for ML offences.

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Immediate Outcome 8

Asset recovery processes lead to confiscation and permanent deprivation of criminal property and property of corresponding value.

Core Issues to be considered in determining if the Outcome is being achieved

1. To what extent is the country: (a) prioritising the pursuit of asset recovery as a policy objective; (b) periodically reviewing the asset recovery regime to ensure its ongoing effectiveness; and (c) using effective agency structures, with adequate resources, and co-operation frameworks?
2. How well are the competent authorities identifying and tracing criminal property and property of corresponding value?
3. How well are the competent authorities freezing and/or seizing criminal property and property of corresponding value? Are provisional measures actively pursued as a result of financial (and parallel) investigations, including in complex/significant cases? To what extent do competent authorities take swift action when circumstances require?
4. How well are the authorities managing frozen or seized property to preserve its value including through pre-confiscation sale or disposal, where appropriate?
5. How well are the competent authorities confiscating (whether through conviction based or non-conviction based procedures), and enforcing confiscation orders for criminal property and property of corresponding value, whether located domestically or abroad?
6. To what extent does the country return confiscated195 property to victims through restitution, compensation or other measures?
7. How well is the country’s declaration or disclosure system identifying and seizing non-declared or falsely-declared cross border movements of currency and bearer negotiable instruments and to what extent are border, customs or other relevant authorities applying effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions? To what extent is the system leading to the confiscation of currency or bearer negotiable instruments related to ML/TF or predicate offences?

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Immediate Outcome 9

Terrorist financing offences and activities are investigated and persons who finance terrorism are prosecuted and subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.

Core Issues to be considered in determining if the Outcome is being achieved

1. How well and in what circumstances is TF activity identified and investigated? To what extent do the investigations identify the specific role played by the terrorist financier?
2. To what extent is TF activity (including different types of TF cases) prosecuted and offenders convicted?
3. To what extent are the sanctions or measures applied against natural and legal persons convicted of TF offences effective, proportionate and dissuasive?
4. To what extent is the investigation, prosecution and conviction of TF considered, and used, in the formulation of national counter-terrorism strategies? How well is information and intelligence obtained in TF investigations, prosecutions and convictions shared and used to support national counter-terrorism purposes and activities (e.g. identification and designation of terrorists, terrorist organisations and terrorist support networks)?
5. To what extent is the objective of the outcome achieved by employing other criminal justice, regulatory or other measures to disrupt TF activities where it is not practicable to secure a TF conviction?

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Immediate Outcome 10

Terrorists, terrorist organisations and terrorist financiers are prevented from raising, moving and using funds.

Core Issues to be considered in determining if the Outcome is being achieved

1. How well is the country implementing, without delay, targeted financial sanctions pursuant to: (i) UNSCR1267 and its successor resolutions; and (ii) UNSCR1373 (at the supra-national or national level, whether on the country’s own motion or after examination, to give effect to the request of another country)?
2. To what extent are the funds and other assets of terrorists, terrorist organisations and terrorist financiers, including designated persons and entities and those acting on their behalf or at their direction, being identified? To what extent are such persons and entities prevented from raising, moving and using funds or other assets, including by operating or executing financial transactions?
3. To what extent, without unduly disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities, has the country applied focused, proportionate and risk-based mitigation measures to only those organisations which fall within the FATF definition of NPOs, in line with identified TF risk?
4. To what extent do financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs comply with and understand their obligations regarding targeted financial sanctions relating to financing of terrorism and terrorist organisations?
5. How well are relevant competent authorities monitoring and ensuring compliance200 by financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs with their obligations regarding targeted financial sanctions relating to financing of terrorism and terrorist organisations?

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Immediate Outcome 11

Persons and entities involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are prevented from raising, moving and using funds, consistent with the relevant UNSCRs.

Core Issues to be considered in determining if the Outcome is being achieved

1. To what extent do the competent authorities co-operate and co-ordinate the development and implementation of policies, and, for operational purposes co-operate and, where appropriate, co-ordinate to combat financing of proliferating of weapons of mass destruction?
2. How well does the country identify, assess and understand and mitigate the risk of potential breaches, non-implementation or evasion of obligations regarding targeted financial sanctions relating to financing of proliferation present in the country in both higher and lower risk scenarios?
3. How well is the country implementing, without delay, targeted financial sanctions concerning the UNSCRs relating to the combating of financing of proliferation?
4. To what extent are the funds or other assets of designated persons and entities and those acting on their behalf or at their direction identified and such persons and entities prevented from operating or from executing financial transactions related to proliferation?
5. To what extent do financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs comply with and understand their obligations regarding targeted financial sanctions relating to financing of proliferation?
6. How well are relevant competent authorities monitoring and ensuring compliance by financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs with their obligations regarding targeted financial sanctions relating to financing of proliferation?